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INTRODUCTION. 
Today’s business world has become virtual and borderless as a result of globalization. As Maroof, 
Shah and Armad (2017) argue, the trend has changed market dynamics from geographical to global. 
The implication is that businesses are faced with intense competition from firms offering the same 
or similar services from elsewhere in the world. Responses to this unfolding business scenario by 
strategists, entrepreneurs and scholars have been sharp and diverse.  
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Fierce competition and increasing customer expectations have led suppliers, manufacturers and 
intermediaries to increasingly focus on delivery speed, enhanced quality, product reliability, and 
service flexibility (Boyer & Lewis, 2002; Flynn & Flynn, 2004; Hunger & Wheelen, 2009). As the 
scope to enhance these capabilities within a single organization decreases, many companies look 
beyond the organization's boundary for help (Bowersox, Closs & Stank, 1999).  
Extant literature suggests that most organizations resort to outside help in improving 
competitiveness, which has been in the form of aligning and/or takeover of some of the business 
processes and activities hitherto provided by other members in the production value chain (David, 
2000; Musso, 2009; Robert, Wallace & Moles, 2012). This alignment and takeover of independent 
but closely related and supportive services in the value chain are what is broadly referred to as 
integration. Integration is either vertical or horizontal (Robert, Wallace and Moles, 2012; Marrof et 
al., 2017), vertical integration may also be backward or forward as suggested by Perrault & 
McCarthy (2005).  
Thomas (2010) argued that backward integration refers to a "firm diversifying closer to the sources 
of raw materials in the stages of production, allowing a firm to control the quality of the supplies 
being purchased. Forward integration, on the other hand, refers to the firm entering the business of 
distributing or selling of present product and moving upwards in the production/distribution process 
towards the consumer" (Hunger & Wheelen, 2009; Fan & Goyal, 2002; Robert, Wallace & Moles, 
2012) 
The debate about integration revolves around the probable inherent benefits associated with such an 
enterprise.  This is especially the case where current thinking favours specialization in a restricted 
area of a firm's comparative advantage while relying on other firms for goods and services outside 
its area of jurisdiction. In this case, it is believed by proponents of the Theory of Comparative 
Advantage (Ricardo, 2009; Selcuk & Kiymaz, 2013) that it will lead to overall benefits and 
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corporate wealth of the participating firms. The latter contradicts the concept of integration and thus 
begs the question as to why should firms integrate? There is general literature appreciation and 
documentation of importance of integration in achieving competitive advantage (Bowersox 
&Morash, 1989; Morris &Calantone, 1991; Lee & Billington, 1992) and enhancing performance 
(Narasimhan & Jayaram, 1998; Johnson, 1999; Ahmad & Schroeder, 2001; Frohlich & Westbrook, 
2001; Stank, Keller &Closs, 2001; Jobber, 2006; Porter, 2008).    
Liu (2013) suggests that vertical integration leads to better coordinating of the production process 
by eliminating hold-up problems of the integrating firm. While works by Slanger (1998), Fan & 
Gayol (2002) and Maroof et al. (2017) support that vertical integration leads to increased quality 
control of inputs, lower cost of production and ultimately improved profit and financial 
performance. Despite an avalanche of studies highlighting the importance and inherent benefits 
associated with vertical integration, there is; however, minimal studies showing how vertical 
integration leads to cost efficiency; or improves the quality of operating input supplies used by 
financial institutions in the operational milieu of a developing society like Nigeria. 
The Nigerian financial system has evolved over time, with the industry operating what could be 
regarded as close to the perfect market. There has been an increased digitalization and automation 
of the process by firms in the industry, leading to a seamless flow of information by all the industry 
participants. There is a symmetry of services rendered to customers, rates charged and costs of 
doing business. The implication is that the post-consolidation era1 of the Nigerian financial industry 
is fraught with heavy competition among firms with little to differentiate industry participants.  
Given the high level of competition in the Nigerian financial industry, it is expected that there will 
be more proclivity towards integration. 
 
1 Bank consolidation was a policy of the Nigerian reserve bank called Central Bank of Nigeria that gave a 
uniform benchmark of the minimum capital base that every bank must possess to be adjudged healthy. This 
policy led to the reduction of the number of banks from 89 banks as at 2004 to 25 banks as 2007. Most of the 
smaller banks were merged or acquired by the big ones.  
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On the contrary, there seems to be wariness and lethargy in opting for vertical integration among 
firms in the industry (Anyanwu & Agwor, 2015). Presently most of the critical ancillary input 
supplies of the financial institutions in Nigeria (Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and cards, 
internet services, cheques, deposit and withdrawal documents) are provided by independent 
organizations such as MasterCard, Verve, Interswitch and some other internet service providers 
(ISPs). These independent supplier organisations directly or indirectly affect the quality of financial 
services rendered by these financial institutions and by extension, their competitiveness.  Generally, 
it is believed that some of the customers’ complaints of slow response time to customer requests 
and poor service delivery may be traceable to the quality of supplies obtained from these 
collaborating firms.    
The overarching research question that is motivating this study is: why is it that Nigerian financial 
firms are wary or slow to embark on integration in their bid to stay ahead of the competition? This 
is especially the case where prevailing industry factors seem to favour vertical integration. In 
seeking to provide answers to this question, the study specifically investigated the two following 
issues: (a) the impact of make rather than buy decision on the quality of operating input supplies 
used by Nigeria’s financial institutions; and (b) the effect of acquiring suppliers’ firm on the overall 
operating cost of a Nigeria financial firm. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Literature review. 
Existing literature abounds on vertical integration, the financial sector of different economies, and 
the impact of vertical integration on the financial sector. However, scholarly literature is scarce on 
the interplay between vertical integration and the Nigerian financial sector. This scarcity of 
academic research on vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector makes this paper very 
significant.  
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This literature review section will, therefore, review existing articles using the following headings: 
Vertical Integration, The Financial Sector, and Vertical Integration in the Financial Sector, The 
Nigerian Financial Sector, and Vertical Integration in the Nigerian Financial Sector, Review of 
Theories of Vertical Integration, and Theoretical Framework for the study. 
Vertical Integration. 
Vertical integration occurs when companies expand backwards to industries that supply their inputs 
or forward to industries that use, distribute, and sell their products (Jones & George, 2009). In 
vertical integration, a company will “integrate several activities in adjacent phases of the production 
and marketing chain located upstream (activities ranging from research and development to 
purchasing) or downstream (activities ranging from the sale and distribution of the final product)” 
(Loureiro, Brou, & Simoes, 2018).  
Vertical integration is a corporate level strategy (Daft, 2014) pursued by strategic managers to 
promote differentiation and cost reduction. It is a fundamental concept in organizational economics 
(Bresnahan & Levin, 2012). Companies involved in vertical integration can have a competitive 
advantage over their competitors and achieve above-average returns (Bresnahan & Levin, 2012; 
McGowan, 2017), but may not be able to create value if the environment changes (Jones & George, 
2009, p.284). Outsourcing and off-shoring can also reduce the prevalence of vertical integration 
(Rossini & Lambertini, 2003). Despite environmental changes, outsourcing and off-shoring, recent 
developments show that large corporations are more inclined towards vertical integration since it is 
the best way to have control over raw materials, manufacturing, and distribution of finished 
products (Worthen, Tuna, & Scheck, Wall Street Journal November 30, 2009 (Doherty, Barron’s, 
November 30, 2009, p.24-25).  
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Vertical integration can help companies gain market power (Baker, Bundorf, & Kessler, 2017). 
Market power gives firms a competitive advantage through reduced operational and market costs, 
quality improvement, and elimination of imitation of the firm's technology (Hitt, Ireland, & 
Hoskisson, 2007, p.179). Crane (2017) argued that companies like Tesla, in the United States, can 
integrate forward to sell their cars directly to the customers to gain more market power and the 
intra-brand competition will not be able to stop them. In other words, Tesla’s forward vertical 
integration would be the best way for the disruptive organization to gain the highly competitive US 
auto industry. Fan, Huang, Morck, & Yeung (2014) support Crane’s argument. They argue that 
vertical integration can circumvent market forces and extend market powers. 
In a technological world, vertical integration is giving way to virtual integration. Virtual Integration 
is vertical integration run by today’s information technologies. In 1998, Michael Dell shared the 
information on how Dell used information technology to close traditional value chain boundaries 
between suppliers, manufacturers, and end-users (Magretta, 1998). Dell defined virtual integration 
as stitching "together a business with partners that are treated as if they are inside the company". 
Virtual integration technologies connect all value chain components and functions in real time. 
Snell (2013) argues that virtual integration, not vertical integration, is the future of supply chain 
management. The latest term for this concept is virtual vertical integration. There is a need for 
further research in this area.  
The Financial Sector. 
The financial sector of any country is the branch of the economy comprising of different firms and 
institutions, which provide financial services to all customers (Kenton, 2019). These customers may 
include commercial and retail customers. The financial sector, therefore, is made up of banks, 
investment companies, money markets, insurance companies, real estate firms, etc. Kenton (2019) 
opines that countries with active financial sectors have healthy economies; those countries that do 
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not have active financial sectors do not have strong economies. However, where skilled labour 
prefers to work in financial institutions, the real economy suffers (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2015). 
Cecchetti & Kharroubi (2015) contend that there is a significant relationship between the financial 
sector and economic growth; this relationship needs further scholarly research.  
The financial sector is essential; therefore, to any economy, whether for good or bad. This sector 
manages short term debts, which it uses to fund risky and illiquid assets (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2015).  
Apart from managing risks, it informs the public about investments, makes sure that capital is 
allocated for such investments, and monitors the management of such investments. It is the engine 
that enables exchanges within the economy (Kurronen, 2012, p.5). Destabilization of the financial 
sector can lead to financial and economic crises (Schleer & Semmler, 2015).  
Vertical Integration in the Financial Sector. 
Vertical integration, as it concerns the financial sector, describes “the practice where banks make 
and sell financial products” (Moran & Best, 2019). In vertical integration banks couple the core 
banking tasks with the selling of insurance, mortgages, wealth management services, and others. In 
some countries, Australia is an example; this coupling of services means a conflict of interest 
(Moran & Best, 2019), which the Royal Commission must fight. However, as in other nations, 
vertical integrations in the financial sector have come to stay though regulated. Vertical integration 
helps the banks to keep control of all banking roles of supplying, producing and retailing financial 
products and services (Corradi & Peacock, 2019). 
Information systems and technologies could disrupt the implementation of vertical integration in the 
financial sector as it has done in other areas of the economy. Alt, Beck, & Smits (2018) found out 
that despite IT diffusion within the financial sectors of different economies, vertical integration is 
still the norm, especially in the banking industry. Alfaro & Charlton (2009) restricted vertical 
9 
integration, erroneously, to manufacturing, but recent studies have shown that vertical integration, 
across time, can also be applied to the financial sector (Herger & McCorriston, 2016).  
Vertical integration with firms in a host country will expand suppliers' activities, and therefore, 
benefiting the host country (Kersting & Gorg, 2014). Damjanovic, Damjanovic, & Nolan (2017) 
argued that vertical integration leads to higher consumption and welfare because it results in higher 
production and lower prices. However, in competitive economies with low monopolistic tendencies, 
vertical integration may not always lead to welfare. 
The Nigerian Financial Sector. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (2017) includes the following as part of the Nigerian financial sector: 
(1) Financial Markets (Money and Capital Markets), (2) Financial Institutions, which regulates, and 
supervises the financial sector, (3) Development Finance Institutions, e.g., Urban Development 
Bank, Nigerian and Rural Cooperatives Bank, (4) Other finance institutions such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, Bureau de change, primary mortgage institutions, (5) Financial 
instruments like treasury bills, treasury certificates, and central bank certificates. 
Structurally, the Nigerian financial sector has both formal (banks and non-bank financial 
institutions) and informal (e.g., local money lenders and loan associations) sections (Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 2017). The loosely organized informal branch of the financial sector has little or no 
regulations. The formal component of the financial sector provides payment systems, pools surplus 
financial resources from savings to fund productive investments, and builds a platform for Nigeria’s 
financial infrastructure (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2017).  
Below are a few of the conclusions of the International Monetary Fund (2013) assessment of 
Nigeria’s financial sector:   
(1) Nigeria’s financial sector suffers from weak governance, non-transparent ownership structures, 
poor financial reporting, and endemic corruption.  
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(2) There are regulatory and supervisory gaps and weaknesses.  
(3) Non-Bank financial institutions need reform. 
(4) Though Nigeria’s financial system seems to be stabilizing, especially in the banking component, 
it needs a long-term rather than a short-term crisis prevention framework. 
(5)  Poor access to financial resources has hampered the economic development of Nigeria. "There 
is negligible intermediation to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by the formal 
financial sector" (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2017, p.9). 
Vertical Integration in the Nigerian Financial Sector. 
Scholarly literature on vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector is scarce. However, in 
2009, Onodje in his argument for a reformation of the Nigerian Financial Sector opined that there 
would be a move from the vertical integration of the banking sector to a horizontal integration of 
the Nigerian Financial System (Onodje, 2009). Adeleke, Uzochukwu, &Akanji (2018) also 
concluded that mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances were fundamental strategies of 
Nigerian financial firms. Yusuf & Raimi (2019) disagree. They found out mergers and acquisitions 
(horizontal integrations) within the financial sector, underperformed when compared with stand-
alone financial institutions. They discovered that mergers and acquisitions are not able to solve 
multiple problems bedevilling the Nigerian financial system. These problems include but not 
limited to "poor corporate governance compliance, poor credit risk policy management and 
ineffective allocation of capital to businesses" (Yusuf & Raimi, 2019, p.133).  
Vertical integration could still be the best approach for the Nigerian financial sector since it will 
allow the firms to control all areas of their businesses. This integration will lead to profitability if 
appropriately regulated. However, as Nigeria becomes more IT-friendly, vertical integration in the 




Neoclassical Theories of Vertical Integration.  
There are many neoclassical theories of vertical integration, and these theories postulate that 
fundamental to understanding vertical integration is a firm’s reaction to or its effort to create market 
power (Joskow, 2010; Post, Buchmueller, & Ryan, 2018). Neoclassical theories of vertical 
integration include the following: vertical externalities (Roelofs & van Vuuren, 2017; D'Alfonso & 
Nastasi, 2014); price discrimination (Wolfe, 2014; Herz & Taubinsky, 2018); Horizontal 
externalities (Grazzini & Petretto, 2014; Joskow, 2010); and vertical foreclosure (Joskow, 2010).  
i. Vertical Externalities. This neoclassical theory postulates that vertical externalities arise when 
there are inefficiencies due to market power in both upstream and downstream markets (Joskow, 
2010). The issue addressed here is double marginalization (Ghili & Schmitt, 2018; Janssen & 
Shelegia, 2015). The problem of double marginalization is due to the non-cooperative setting of 
prices by upstream and downstream firms, which hurts both the firms and their customers. Bryan 
& Hovenkamp (2016) argued: "that double marginalization both injure consumers and erodes 
joint profits relative to integration." This theory explains that it is preferable for upstream and 
downstream monopolies to integrate vertically in order to become more profitable to firms and 
consumers (Hans, 2015). 
ii. Price Discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when a firm sets different prices for the same 
product or service (Depoorter & Meurer, 2018). Firms have many reasons for price 
discrimination. An example is a train ticket. Some people purchase tickets late and therefore may 
pay more for the same service, or they pay more because they wish to sit in the first-class section 
of the train. All travellers will have the same service as being moved from one station to another. 
Price discrimination could be first degree, second degree or third degree (Depoorter & Meurer, 
2018).  
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First-degree price discrimination involves identical goods or services being sold at different 
prices to different individuals. Second-degree price discrimination involves different prices for 
different quantities, e.g., if one is purchasing large quantities, the one pays less. Third-degree 
price discrimination involves segmentation of markets, and the different segments of the market 
being charged different prices for the same products. Price discrimination leads to arbitrage. 
"Arbitrage is buying a security in one market and simultaneously selling it in another market at a 
higher price, profiting from the temporary difference in prices. This is considered a risk-free 
profit for the investor/trader" (Lioudis, 2019).  
Arbitrage can lead to several lawsuits that will prevent a firm from focusing on why it was 
created (Chowdhury, Antuca, & Lauer, 2018). These lawsuits result when the government feels 
that a firm is anticompetitive. Vertical integration could help firms to operate without arbitrage 
issues. Upstream monopolies can be involved profitably in third-degree price discrimination by 
charging different prices to downstream firms depending on the elasticity of derived demands 
(Joskow, 2010). However, this price discrimination could lead to firms that bought at a low price 
to resell to the firms that purchased at a higher price defeating the third-degree price 
discrimination strategy. The theory of price discrimination explains the way out of this dilemma; 
the firm must integrate downstream to maximize profit (Andreou, Louca, & Panayides, 2015; 
Joskow, 2010). 
iii. Horizontal Externalities. Upstream firms' products and services may be affected by downstream 
sales and after-sale services. The benefits seem to accrue to the downstream firms. This situation 
could lead downstream firms to disinvest in retail. The solution to this problem is for the 
upstream firm to integrate downstream vertically. Horizontal externalities have been found to 
strengthen the networks, which aid the success of development banks (Noman & Stiglitz, 2016) 
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and private companies. These integrations could lead to antitrust scrutiny (Post, Buchmueller, & 
Ryan, 2018), and even an increase in prices (Cooper, Craig, Gaynor, & Van Reenen, 2015). 
iv. Vertical Foreclosure. Another neoclassical theory is vertical foreclosure. “The predictions of 
vertical foreclosure are clear: Market competitiveness will decline, and competitor costs and 
market prices will increase as their access to inputs decrease” (Post, Buchmueller, & Ryan, 
2018). In vertical foreclosure, a downstream firm can foreclose an upstream competitor by 
vertically integrating with the firm and thereby creating a high barrier to entry either in the 
upstream or downstream industry. 
Contractual Theories of Vertical Integration. 
Apart from the neoclassical theories of vertical integration, there are also contractual theories of 
vertical integration. The contractual theories of virtual integration include the following: 
Transaction Cost Theory, The Property Rights Model, Decision Rights Model, Incentive Rights 
Models, and Capabilities Theories. 
i. Transaction Cost Theory: Market contracts are complex, uncertain, sometimes inefficient, and 
opportunistic, and could lead to disputes, holdups, and costly litigations (Bresnahan & Levin, 
2012). The transaction cost theory postulates “integration can be an effective response when 
these features are present”(Bresnahan & Levin, 2012, p.4). It assumes that since transaction costs 
are insensitive to the above-stated issues, vertical integration is the optimal step to resolve them. 
It predicts that uncertain and complex market conditions favour vertical integration.  
ii. The Property Rights Model: In this theory, “integration changes the incentives to make specific 
investments” (Bresnahan & Levin, 2012, p.7). This theory claims that “transactions are 
incomplete” (Driffield, Mickiewicz, & Temouri, 2016); therefore, ownership is emphasized. The 
theory stresses that ownership and the control of it rest on those firms with the most significant 
impact on the venture (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Slaev, 2017; Holden, 2017). In the Property 
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Rights Model, firms are viewed as physical assets; therefore, integration downstream or 
upstream is dependent on changes in ownership of assets. Bargaining becomes very important. 
"A move toward integration increases the investment incentives of the acquiring party but lowers 
the incentives of the acquired party" (Bresnahan & Levin, 2012, p.7).  
iii. Decision Rights Model: In this model, it is assumed that bargaining is incomplete and 
inefficient. This model postulates that ownership is directly proportional to decision making 
rather than on assets (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2011). “The approach taken in recent decision 
rights models may be a promising framework for empirical research, particularly for studies 
where it is possible to observe decision processes and outcomes in integrated and non-integrated 
situations” (Bresnahan & Levin, 2012, p.10). 
iv. Incentive Rights Model: The core of this theory is on how vertical integration affects the 
financial incentives of employees and their managers. This model is most applicable to 
franchising. Shifts impact integration in incentives rather than shifts in ownership (Songqin & 
Lei, 2017; Bresnahan & Levin, 2012). 
v. Capabilities Theory: The capabilities theory moves beyond the ownership of assets or 
transaction costs to the acquisition of human capabilities. Organizational competencies are 
embedded in the employees and managers. These capabilities are not easily transferred across 
firm boundaries. "Firms differ in managerial know-how, and this difference is important for 
production" (Bresnahan & Levin, 2012, p.12). Hart & Holmstrom (2010) argue that “managerial 
authority tends to coincide with firm boundaries. 
Summary of theories. 
Neoclassical theories and contractual theories explain why vertical integration should be applied in 
the financial sector. Neoclassical theories include vertical externalities, price discrimination, 
horizontal externalities, and vertical foreclosure. Contractual theories include the following: 
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transaction cost theory, property rights model, decision rights model, and capabilities theory. None 
of these theories, on its own, can adequately explain vertical integration in the Nigerian financial 
sector. It is, therefore, important that a unique theoretical framework based on the factors or 
variables affecting vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector be developed.  
Factors Affecting Vertical Integration in the Financial Sector. 
Buckley (2008) gave four factors that affect vertical integration; they are: technical factors (e.g. 
high fixed costs, continuous flow technology, inventory, economies of scope, etc), market power 
(e.g. downstream substitution, upstream substitution, monopsony, entry-deterrence, etc.), dynamic 
factors (e.g. division of labor), and fiscal factors (e.g. transfer pricing, price regulations, foreign 
equity participation, etc.). Sales and profitability are factors that impact vertical integration 
positively, whereas, costs will impact vertical integration negatively (Korhonen, Zhang, & 
Toppinen, 2014).  
Macchiavello (2009) argued that higher financial development leads to an increase in vertical 
integration. An excellent financial environment, production and firm organization, financial 
constraints and financial contracts are, therefore, essential factors that influence vertical integration. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton (2009) agree that companies in countries with higher contracting 
costs and financial development, especially, in capital-intensive industries are more prone to 
integrate vertically.  
Theoretical Framework of Vertical Integration in the Nigerian Financial Sector. 
The uncertainties within the Nigerian Financial Sector do not allow anyone theory to explain the 
vertical integration behaviour of the financial organizations within the sector. The best would be to 
develop a theoretical framework based on the factors affecting vertical integration in the Nigerian 
















Fig 1: Theoretical Framework of Vertical Integration in the Nigerian Financial Sector. 
In this theoretical framework, vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector (dependent 
variable) is influenced or impacted by a hybrid of factors (independent variables) including: 
technical factors, market power, dynamic factors, fiscal factors, sales, profitability, higher financial 
development, decision to integrate vertically (make or buy decisions and others), and contracting 
costs. The intervening variables are types of financial organization (formal or informal), and the 
moderating or modifying variable is the Nigerian economy.  
This paper dwells on one of the independent variables, which is, how the decision to integrate 
vertically (make or buy decisions) impact vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector. It is 
Vertical Integration 








Higher Financial Development 
The decision to integrate vertically 
Contracting Costs 
The Nigerian Economy 
Type of Financial Organization 
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recommended that further research be completed to understand how the rest of the variables impact 
vertical integration in the Nigerian financial sector. 
Variables clarifications and hypotheses formulation. 
Integration is thought of a situation where related productive activities that used to be performed by 
different organizations are now being undertaken by one organization. Before integration, you have 
one firm (Principal) that outsources or buys products from another firm (ancillary) which the former 
uses in its productive activities. There are several considerations in the literature to justify such 
interdependence between the principal and the ancillary. Three of such considerations are quality of 
inputs, cost and availability.   
If the Principal considers it cheaper to buy the products from the ancillary firms without 
compromising the quality and availability; they will buy (outsource) rather than make (produce it 
in-house) the products. If on the other hand, it is cheaper or there is a tendency of getting a better 
quality or being available if it is made in-house, then the Principal will be more willing to integrate.  
So the key variables used to capture integration in this study are make (in-house provision) or buy 
(outsource). This leads us to the first hypothesis, which is: 
H01: There is no significant impact of make rather than buy decision on the quality of input supplies 
used by Nigeria’s financial institutions. 
Ha1: There is a significant positive impact of make rather than buy decision on the quality of input 
supplies used by Nigeria’s financial institutions 
Another way, albeit radical, of undertaking integration, is by acquiring the firm (ancillary) that used 
to supply resource inputs to the principal firm. This is usually the case if the time, expertise and 
resources required to produce in-house are humongous, and yet the principal still wants to dictate 
the quality, availability and costs of supplies. This acquisition may not always be easy, but it could 
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come in the form of outright purchase of the firm or partial equity holding in the business.  This 
leads us to the second hypothesis that captures the second variant of integration in this study: 
H02: Supplier’s acquisition does not significantly reduce the overall operating cost of a financial 
firm. 
Ha2: Supplier's acquisition significantly reduces the overall operating cost of a financial firm. 
Methods. 
This study adopted a quantitative design with a cross-sectional survey strategy. This approach is apt 
because it provided an opportunity to obtain data from key stakeholders about the backward 
integration of financial services. The South West of Nigeria was selected because it houses the 
financial capital of Nigeria, which is Lagos, and its neighbouring cities of Ibadan and Shagamu. 
The South West region of Nigeria comprises six states: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo 
states. Registered formal financial institutions (money deposit banks and insurance companies) in 
Southwest, Nigeria constituted the population of the study. The total population is 37 firms 
comprising 22 money deposit banks (MDB) and 15 composite insurance firms registered and 
supervised by the regulatory agency National Insurance Commission (NAICOM).  
A multi-stage method was used in drawing the required sampling frame from the total population.  
First, out of a population frame of 22  MDBs  registered  by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as 
at  2016 (i.e. Access Bank, CitiBank, Diamond Bank, EcoBank, Enterprise Bank, Fidelity Bank, 
First Bank, FCMB, GTBank, Heritage Bank, Keystone Bank, Mainstreet Bank, SkyeBank, Stanbic 
IBTC Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Sterling Bank, SunTrust Bank, Union Bank, UBA, Unity 
Bank, Wema Bank, Zenith Bank), a total of 7 MDBs were purposively selected as sample for this 
study and out of the population frame of  15 registered composite insurance firms under NAICOM 
as at year 2016 (i.e. AIICO Insurance, Cornerstone Insurance, Axa Mansard Insurance, IGI, 
Leadway Insurance, Niger Insurance, Ensure Insurance, NICON Insurance, Goldlink Insurance, 
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NSIA Insurance, Great Nigeria Insurance, LASACO Assurance, Standard Alliance Insurance, 
Royal Exchange Insurance) a total of 5 insurance institutions was purposively selected.   
The criteria for selecting the sample were age, asset and customer base, respectively. The selected 
12 financial institutions were Fidelity Bank, GTBank, Access Bank, Diamond Bank, First Bank, 
Zenith Bank, United Bank, AIICO Insurance, Leadway Assurance, Royal Exchange General 
Assurance, Cornerstone Insurance and Niger Insurance.  
The total population of the management staff of the selected firms was 2,553. A sample size of 753 
was derived using the Trek (2012) formula. To select the respondents from the population, random 
sampling technique was adopted. The rationale for this is that respondents at the level of 
management share equal access to the information being looked for. A well-structured 
questionnaire was used for the data collection. The 5-point Likert scale with SA – Strongly Agree, 
A – Agree, U – Uncertain, D – Disagree, SD – Strongly Disagree was used to develop the answer 
options for the questionnaire. This study adopted descriptive statistics to analyze the responses of 
respondents while test of the validity of formulated hypotheses was done using least square 
regression.  
Results. 
A total of seven hundred, fifty-three copies of questionnaire were administered to the management 
staff of twelve selected financial institutions. Six hundred, ninety-nine copies of the questionnaire 
were retrieved, which amounted to a 92.8% response rate. A total of fifty-four copies of the 
questionnaire were not retrievable, which amounted to 7.2%.  
All the six hundred and ninety-nine copies of the questionnaire retrieved were useable. Based on the 
copies of the questionnaire retrieved, the demographic information showing the demographic 
distribution based on age, gender and educational qualifications are as follows: The age distribution 
of the respondents are: 18-24y (201-28.8%); 25-34y (227=32.5%); 35-44y (134=19.2%); 45-54y 
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(77=11.0%); 55-64y (49=7.0%); while 65y and above (11=1.5%). The result reveals that most of 
the respondents were between the ages of 25-34 years (227). This number represents 32.5% of the 
total number of respondents. However, respondents within the 65 years and above were the least in 
terms of number (11=1.5%). This implies that most respondents in the Nigeria financial institutions 
are young people. This also shows that majority of the respondents are young adults who can 
independently give an informed opinion. 
Data reveals the fair sex distribution of the respondents: male (336-48.1%) and female (363-
51.9%). Inspite of the 3.8% difference between the two sex categories, data obtained represents a 
rich and balanced opinion of both genders. Information provided by respondents on educational 
qualification reveals the following distribution:  PhD holders (3-0.4%); MBA/MSc (231-33.1%); 
BSc/HND holders (305-43.6%); and ND/NCE holders (160-22.9%). Data show that more 
respondents hold a first degree or Higher National Diploma (HND) (305), 231 hold MBA/MSc and 
the least were PhD holders with three respondents.    
Hypotheses formulated were tested using the z-test and ordinary least regression. 
H01: There is no significant impact of make rather than buy decision on the quality of input supplies 
used by Nigeria’s financial institutions. 
Ha1: There is a significant positive impact of make rather than buy decision on the quality of input 
supplies used by Nigeria’s financial institutions. 
Table 1a: One-Sample Statistics. 
 








699 28.4100 22.12101 4.91221 
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Table1b: One-Sample Z-Test. 
 Test Value = 0 
 
z df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 




27.910 698 .003 28.4100 17.7400 46.1500 
Source: SPSS Analysis of Field Data 2018. 
Table 1a presents the mean value and standard deviation (SD) of the responses received. The 
analysis revealed that a grand mean score of 28.41 and standard deviation of 22.12. In the second 
table, the z-value was given as 27.910 with a significant value of 0.003. Since the significant value 
(0.003) as shown in table 1b is less than 0.05 and the Z-value (27.910) is high, the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  The inference drawn, therefore, is that make rather than buy decision significantly 
improved the quality of input supplies used by Nigeria’s financial institutions. 
H02: Supplier’s acquisition does not significantly reduce the overall operating cost of a financial 
firm. 
Ha2: Supplier’s acquisition will reduce the overall operating cost of a financial firm. 
Regression model:  Y= α = βX+ µ…. (For all observations i, = 1, 2 …n) 
Where Y = Overall operating cost 
            X = Supplier’s acquisition. 
            µ = error term of random variable 
            α = a constant amount 
            β = effect of X hypothesized to be positive 
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Hence, the regression (predict) equation will be Y = 99.331+0.114X 
Table 2a: Model Summary. 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .661 .422 .433 28.22119 
a. Predictors (Constant): supplier’s acquisition. 
Table 2b: ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22166.221 1 22166.221 15.131 .003a 
Residual 4722.979 698 1464.954   
Total 26889.200 699    
a. Predictors: (Constant), supplier’s acquisition.  
b. Dependent Variable: overall operating cost. 





T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 99.331 44.811  2.113 .004 
supplier 
acquisition 
.114 .336 .939 3.552 .003 
a. Dependent Variable: overall operating cost. 
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Table 2a, b & c show that the supplier's acquisition reduced the overall operating cost of a financial 
firm. The F-value is calculated as the Mean Square Regression (22166.221) divided by the Mean 
Square Residual (1464.954), yielding F=15.131. This shows a statistically significant relationship 
(Sig =0.003). The implication is that supplier acquisition accounted for 42.2% reduction on the 
overall operating costs (R = .042, F (1, 698) = 15.131, p< .05).  
Since the results of the ANOVA in table 2b show a significant level of 0.003, and F value of 15.131 
being high, the alternate hypothesis which states that ‘supplier’s acquisition had reduced effect on 
the overall operating cost of a financial firm’ is therefore accepted.  
Discussion. 
The result of the study shows that make rather than buy decision significantly improves the quality 
of input supplies used by Nigeria’s financial institutions. This result implies that it is better for 
financial organizations to provide its inputs within the organizations rather than to outsource such 
services to external firms. When this is done, the integrity of the quality and the speed of delivery 
are guaranteed.  
This finding agrees with that of Mamman, Aminu and Adah (2013) who suggested that the making 
of the needed input materials have a multiplier effect on both the quantity and quality of operating 
supplies used by any firm and it certainly will improve productivity significantly. Dorsey and 
Boland (2009) corroborated this position when they assert that the provision of the raw materials in 
-house goes a long way in controlling supplier opportunism and exploitation and it has implications 
for the development of business growth in the face of uncertainties. Jones and Miskell (2007), as 
well as Hunold, Röller, and Stahl (2012) in their respective findings showed that the business 
creation of make decision allows such organization to build on their internal competencies and 
reliability.  
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Conversely, Köhler (2014) supported by Hill (2015) have contended that the in-house production of 
inputs has an adverse effect on the quality of input supplies used by organizations. The process of 
spending time and resources to make the inputs that it will use for production will spread its 
competencies and resources too lean to maintain high quality consistently. In some cases, the input 
production may fall outside their primary area of comparative advantage, thereby leading to 
inefficiency of operations. The deviation of these findings from the mainstream study finding may 
be due to variation in approaches used or the differences in cultural settings. Kohler (2014) seemed 
to have worked in an advanced economy that is different from developing economy like Nigeria 
that is bedevilled by several challenges. 
The second finding shows that the supplier’s acquisition positively affected (i.e. minimized) the 
overall operating cost of Nigeria financial firms. The implication is that, by integrating backwards 
to acquire firms that used to provide supplies to it will have a long run reduction effect on the 
overall operating cost of a financial firm. This supports the work of Jones and Miskell (2007), who 
postulated that there is considerable evidence for acquiring suppliers in the value chain. Although 
many acquisitions fail, often because of post-acquisition problems, this nevertheless does not 
jeopardize the cost benefits associated with it. Mutura, Nyairo, Mwangi and Wambugu (2016) in 
support of the work of Mamman, Aminu and Adah (2013) found that business organizations can 
learn on cost efficiency management strategies if the source of the input is created or taken over. 
The findings also support the result of Arikan and Stulz (2011) which revealed that setting up of 
input creating units or buying over of an established source of supply will be better tactics to 
minimizing the cost of operating in a business dominated bycompetitors. This may be because most 
of these studies were conducted within a similar socio-cultural context. 
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On the other hand, Hunold, Röller, and Stahl (2012), supported by Gil (2012) argued that exposure 
and taken over of supply might not necessarily affect the cost of production due to the perceived 
potential uncertainties associated with backward integration. Further, our result diverged from the 
outcome of Milliou and Sandonis (2014) who have conducted a study on manufacturers' merger and 
product varieties and explained that backward acquisition and merger with the supplier has little or 
no impact on the cost of producing needed input. The differences in the result of this work with that 
of Gil (2012) may be because a quantitative approach was adopted by the latter unlike triangulation 
method used by Hunold, Röller, and Stahl (2012). 
CONCLUSIONS. 
This study investigated the effect of verticals integration on the quality of output and the production 
cost. Though, it was discovered that the dominant growth and competitive strategy used by most 
firms in the financial industry is mainly horizontal integration.  
This study confirms that merger, acquisition and strategic alliances among companies in the Nigeria 
financial sector, for the most part, have yielded positive result; it, however, found out that continued 
reliance on horizontal integration will not guarantee long-run growth in the financial industry.  
The study establishes the efficacy of backward and forward integration in the realization of the 
long-run benefits of firms in the Nigerian financial industry. It has encouraged firms in the industry, 
which hitherto, have shied away from using it due to risks and huge costs associated with its 
implementation in the short run, to embrace it for long-run strategic growth.  
Following the findings of this study, Nigerian financial organizations are advised to shore up their 
competitiveness by setting up a subsidiary where needed inputs could be developed in order to 
enhance the input quality and reliability. Alternatively, financial institutions could seek out non-
performing supplier organization to wholly acquire or substantially invest in. Despite the short run 
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substantial financial outlay of this strategic move, it will no doubt yield long-run production cost 
efficiency and competitiveness for organizations that embark on it.  
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